There is a number of reasons why issues of representation remain largely unexplored in the literature on non-recognized states. The closed nature of these regimes and the lack of relevant and reliable data contribute to the paucity of research in this area; as noted by one student of these regimes: -Eurasia's de facto countries are informational black holes‖. 5 A further reason is a productive but restrictive preoccupation with the dynamics of interactions between metropolitan states and secession-seeking regions. Discussion of these interactions often entails simplifying assumptions on the homogeneous nature of the elites representing secessionist entities. This discussion also increasingly focuses on various aspects of power sharing between metropolitan and secessionist elites. This paper problematizes the issue of the homogeneity of elite preferences and societal consensus in support of secessionist policies. In doing so it relies on examining patterns of political representation in Transnistria. The paper argues that exploring the ethnic, sociodemographic, and occupational characteristics of elites provides insight into both the sources of their preferences for secessionist policies and into the mechanisms of elite selection in hybrid political regimes. It claims that persistent restrictions on political participation and contestation shape the patterns of political representation, in particular by minimizing the possibility that political entrepreneurs with a policy agenda different to that of the incumbent can win political office and consolidate societal support for policies other than secession.
By examining the composition of the Transnistrian political elite throughout the period of Soviet disintegration and the history of de facto independence, this paper identifies systematic patterns of under-representation of certain ethnic and social groups. It is argued that this underrepresentation has been translated into a lack of articulated policy alternatives which, given certain underlying characteristics of the Transnistrian conflict, should have been present in the public domain. The fact that secessionist policy objectives remain unchallenged within
Transnistrian society is thus interpreted as a consequence of the limits imposed on political contestation. It is regarded as a product of the systematic exclusion from the political elite of representatives of societal groups with the largest stake in resolving the currently ‗frozen' conflict through some form of coexistence with Moldova within the framework of a common state.
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By focusing on patterns of under-representation, the proposed analysis challenges dominant explanations of the region's commitment to secession. Transnistria is an example of a multiethnic region. The high level of ethnic heterogeneity in the region led a number of scholars to search for an explanation to the secessionist phenomena in the existence of a strong regional identity. -Politicized regionalism‖ is a term frequently invoked in accounts of Transnistria's secession from Moldova. 8 This paper provides grounds for questioning the existence of broad regional consensus both for the elites' initial decision to escalate confrontation with the central government as well as for later policies seeking to resolve the long-standing conflict through the pursuit of unconditional independence.
The examination of representational outcomes in the case of Transnistria also encourages to focus on issues other than democratization-fuelled processes of nationalistic outbidding and radical activism. The latter issues are central to the existing literature's discussion of mechanisms of conflict escalation in the Eurasian zone. This literature emphasizes the importance of pre- and addressed issues such as the rules of cabinet and constitutional court formation, the introduction of the office of prime minister, and the legislative powers of the president. Although the draft was not passed, it was widely considered to be a serious challenge to the existing presidential system and a direct attack on the local -guarantor of stability‖, the Transnistrian President Smirnov. 11 In short, the regional parliament is the main forum in which the pluralist dynamics of the Transnistrian political system play themselves out.
This paper begins with a discussion of the ethnic dimension of political representation.
Ethnicity, along with certain other demographic characteristics of the Transnistrian parliamentary elites, are analyzed in terms of their effect on the motivation of elites to initiate and sustain policies of secession. The characteristics of elites and of the wider population are compared, and the possibility of decoupling the preferences of politicians from the preferences of societal groups is explored. The next section of the paper discusses the complex political nature of the Transnistrian regime, which combines elements of genuine political competition with severe restrictions on the ability of opposition candidates to gain representation in parliament and to articulate policy alternatives to the pursuit of full independence. The final section examines the nature of the parliamentary alliance that serves as the main source of support for the Transnistrian regime. In doing so, the section sheds further light on mechanisms which are used to ensure that different types of political actors remain locked into the regime's secessionist course. The very high level of under-representation of the Moldovans during the first term of the Transnistrian parliament is especially important if one takes into account the role of parliament in the dynamics of the secessionist conflict. The first parliament presided over the initial period of implementation of the secessionist agenda and over the progressive escalation of the confrontation between the region and the metropolitan state that led to armed conflict in the spring/summer of 1992. 17 The data in Table 1 The under-representation of ethnic Moldovans indicated in Table 1 The second factor is a set of practices that limited political competition, to be discussed in more detail in the following section. Politicians from the ethnic Moldovan community posed the most credible challenge to the secessionist agenda pursued by regional authorities. As a result, efforts on the part of the authorities to restrict political competition and to inhibit candidates from gaining parliamentary seats were directed in particular against potential challengers from the ethnic Moldovan community, thus further decreasing their chances of obtaining equal representation in parliament.
Ethnic representation and ethnic elite preferences
Other types of constituencies could also claim under-representation in the Transnistrian case. In the context of our discussion of the differences in the composition of the elite and of society in general, data on the birthplaces of parliamentary deputies can provide useful information on other than ethnic forms of elites' belonging to a territory and its population. In the case of the Transnistrian parliament, such data was only available in relatively complete form for the 2005-2010 parliamentary term.
As the following table indicates, less than a third of deputies were born in Transnistria.
This is a very small percentage given the importance of community entrenchment for elected representatives, especially in societies that use the SMD electoral formula. The limited local connection of non-native deputies is further underscored by data relating to the location of the institutions where they received their higher education. Out of the twenty-one deputies born outside Transnistria or Moldova proper, only two received their higher education in Transnistria, and another three did so in the Moldova. The rest studied at universities located in other parts of the former Soviet Union. 25 The next section of the paper addresses the question of why these political entrepreneurs did not succeed in articulating alternative policies and how they failed on the basis of constituency support for such policies to get themselves elected into the Transnistrian parliament.
Political contestation and elite turnover
The study of political regimes that fall on the continuum between democratic and authoritarian systems has received a lot of attention in literature on the post-communist transition. The Transnistrian regime is not original in the way it handles political competition and has employed many of the practices described in the literature on intermediate political regimes.
These include selective law enforcement, the arbitrary application of administrative norms and regulations, the use of state ownership as a means of exerting political influence, the politicization of government bureaucracy, and the management of state -run enterprises. As in other cases, these practices are sanctioned by political leaders in control of the executive. They are intended to provide incumbents with an in-built advantage in different political arenas and to limit the ability of the opposition to contest those in power, above all in the electoral field. The measures used against the Transnistrian opposition varied in their repressiveness.
The most radical critics of secessionism were framed as posing a threat to state security. For example, the so-called Ilaşcu group, which included four ethnic Moldovans that were especially active and vocal in their opposition to secessionist policies, were imprisoned for twelve to fifteen years in 1992. 28 The Transnistrian security apparatus became notorious in the region and was used as an instrument of intimidation against those who opposed the Transnistrian leadership in its quest for independence.
Opposition activists whose position was less radical and who tended to come from the Slavic population of the region, routinely claimed harassment of their organizations and media outlets by law enforcement and regulatory authorities. They also stressed their inability to campaign effectively during elections and accused authorities of outright electoral fraud. T he latter was made possible by executive control of electoral commissions at all levels of government.
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Attempts by opposition groups to contest policies were also undermined by the ability of the authorities to delay institutionalization of political parties. for elite accountability and to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of domestic and international audiences, the authorities chose to allow a substantial degree of pluralist electoral competition.
Multi-candidate electoral races in each of the territorial districts, free air time for candidates, media-broadcasted debates between candidates running in the same district, and the presence of international observers from a distinct group of countries sympathetic to the regime have all become hallmarks of parliamentary campaigns in Transnistria. The electoral legislation of the region contains a detailed set of rules and procedures as well academic commentaries, all designed to convey the seriousness of the authorities in their approach to organizing elections.
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More importantly, the existence of elements of genuine electoral contestation in the Transnistrian political system, something that regime critics often deny, is reflected in the outcomes of electoral races. The incumbency rate-that is, the percentage of sitting parliamentary deputies who secure re-election-is an outcome that is important in a discussion of political competitiveness. All things being equal, a low incumbency rate might indicate a higher degree of uncertainty about the outcomes of the electoral process and a more competitive political environment. The following table presents incumbency data for all parliamentary terms in Transnistria. agree that they were multi-candidate only in a nominal sense. In neither of the elections was any other candidate able to gain more than about 10% of the vote. On each occasion, the opposition candidates claimed that the elections were unfair and that voting results were rigged. As one opposition politician noted, the stakes in presidential elections were much higher for the authorities than those of any parliamentary race in individual legislative districts, and this led to a much higher rate of manipulation and allegedly to outright fraud in presidential elections. Although the literature on political recruitment has long argued that occupational background is an important factor in explaining both electoral success and the subsequent behaviour of elected representatives once in office, there is no consensus on how differences in occupational background should be conceptualized. 35 The shortcomings of some well-known classifications include the use of non-mutually exclusive coding categories and the lack of clear procedures for making coding decisions in situations where a deputy has had several professional or occupational backgrounds. These deficiencies make it difficult to compare occupational background data and to draw descriptive and causal inferences on the basis of that data.
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The following analysis is based on a dataset that was constructed using coding procedures that attempt to address these issues of classification. The coding of occupational background, presented in Table 4 into parliament in any given legislative term was used for making coding decisions about occupational background. The information on the last job is more important for the purposes of this analysis than data on formal professional background-that is, whether a person was trained as an engineer or a doctor. The latter is often used as an indicator of occupational background in recruitment literature. Although information on formal professional training was also collected for the dataset, it is assumed not to be as central to the task of uncovering the types of resources and connections available to a parliamentary candidate as information relating to the last job held. The occupational background of deputies with a status of parliamentary newcomer is classified in Table 4 into one of nine categories. 37 As the last column indicates, business managers and civil servants dominate the ranks of parliamentary representatives in Transnistria.
65% of all newcomers belong to these two categories. Professional background, which includes occupations such as engineers, lawyers, economists, medical doctors, is a distant third occupational category. Whilst the distribution of occupational backgrounds in society at large shows a professional background to be the second most frequent category after trade, only 14% of newcomers in the parliament were professionals.
The results obtained suggest a particular pattern of occupational composition in the has been consistently high throughout all parliamentary terms, with the exception of the last.
Given that incumbency rates have increased over time, many deputies with civil service backgrounds who had entered parliament from the state bureaucracy in previous terms were returned to parliament as incumbents for the latest term.
Overall, the data points to the unquestionable dominance of business managers and bureaucrats in the ranks of parliamentary representatives. Although, as mentioned previously, multi-candidate legislative races are the rule in Transnistria and many candidates from various occupational backgrounds routinely take part in electoral contests in each of the legislative districts, the winners are drawn primarily from these two occupational fields. This suggests that membership of one of these two groups, which are numerically small within society at large, provides a candidate with important advantages in the executive-controlled electoral competition.
The results presented in Table 4 also provide further evidence for the earlier observation relating to the marginal effects of parties on the political process in Transnistria. One of the categories of occupational background -political background -was intended to capture whether any of deputies was engaged in professional political activity prior to entry into parliament. This was defined as full-time occupation of any elected office or full-time employment in a political party. As the table reveals, the highest number of deputies with a professional political background was to be found in the 1990-1995 legislature. These were the former communist party apparatchiks who won seats in the 1990 elections. There were no deputies with a professional political background in the last two legislative terms, which suggests that no deputy (excluding incumbents) was engaged in politics full-time prior to entering parliament.
Professional politicians-who in modern democracies reside in parties, and who are one of the main sources of candidates for elected positions even in new democracies-have been virtually absent from the Transnistrian political scene.
The functioning of the Transnistrian political system is shaped by interest group, rather than party-based, politics. Business groups and bureaucracies are the key actors in domestic politics of the de facto state, not political parties. As argued earlier, both the communist legacy and the deliberate choices of the Transnistrian authorities, especially with respect to electoral laws and party registration issues, contributed to this peculiar structuring of the political system. 41 A very small proportion of deputies who studied law is a particu larly striking feature of this distributions. Less than 5% of deputies had a law degree at the time of their entry in parliament. Th is can be attributed to a legacy of the Soviet educational system, which gave priority to the education of industrial managers, engineers, and other types of specialists with hard sciences or managerial background. The data also pointed that a relatively lo w percentage of deputies, about 7%, with police and military train ing, which is contrary to some expectations advanced in the literature regarding social and educationa l make-up of the Transnistrian elite. argued that the Transnistrian republic currently represents a sophisticated version of just such a non-democratic state.
Conclusion
This paper has emphasized that pursuit of a secessionist agenda can mean that the leadership of a secessionist movement is faced with difficult choices in relation to the adoption of democratic norms and principles. Initiating, and in particular sustaining, a course towards secession is not a policy that necessarily trumps all the alternatives in a democratic setting, especially if the secessionist region has multiple and diverse links to the metropolitan state. The
Transnistrian leadership chose to severely restrict political competition in order to consolidate its hold on power and to maintain the appearance of public consensus on the issue of independence.
Restrictions on political contestation had numerous consequences, including the artificial narrowing of the range of policy options and political candidates that would otherwise have been available to the Transnistrian population.
The analysis of the Transnistrian case encourages us to shift the focus of our attention in evaluating secessionist claims from discussing the levels of societal support for the policy of 
